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Erkenntnis in Kant’s Logical Works 
By Curtis Sommerlatte 
Abstract 
In this paper, I aim to shed light on Kant’s notion of Erkenntnis or cognition by 
focusing on texts pertaining to Kant’s thoughts on logic. Although a passage from Kant’s 
Logik is widely referred to for understanding Kant’s conception of Erkenntnis, this work 
was not penned by Kant himself but rather compiled by Benjamin Jäsche. So, it is 
imperative to determine the passage’s fidelity to Kant’s thought. I compare the passage 
with other sources, including Reflexionen and students’ lecture notes. I argue that several 
of the text’s peculiarities stem from Jäsche rather than Kant, but that nevertheless Jäsche 
largely got Kant's view right, with two major exceptions. First, Jäsche’s text fails to 
reproduce Kant’s key thesis that kennen and verstehen are jointly sufficient for 
Erkenntnis. Second, Jäsche’s text is not a reliable source for attributing to Kant the view 
that animals have consciousness. 
1. Degrees of Erkenntnis in the Logik and Reflexionen 
In the Logik, there is a commonly-cited passage for understanding Kant’s 
conceptions of Erkenntnis and other mental states. Many commentators use this passage 
either without acknowledging that Kant himself did not pen the text or without 
investigating its fidelity to Kant’s thought.1 I aim here to begin such an investigation. 
Jäsche had access to Kant’s personal copy of Georg Friedrich Meier’s Auszug aus der 
Vernunftlehre, and it is clear that Jäsche used many of Kant’s Reflexionen written in that 
book for compiling the Logik.2 For the passage in question, it is evident that Jäsche used 
Reflexion 2394.3 Here are the two passages side-by-side, excluding the last degree of 
comprehending something [etwas begreifen]: 
Log, AA 09: 64-65 Refl, AA 16: 342-343 (R2394) 
In Ansehung des objectiven Gehaltes unserer Folgende Grade sind zu unterscheiden 
                                                 
1 See: Allais, Lucy: Kant, Non-Conceptual Content and the Representation of Space. In: Journal of the 
History of Philosophy 47/3 (2009): footnote on 392f.; Keller, Pierre: Kant and the Demands of Self-
Consciousness. Cambridge 1999: footnote on 245; Kitcher, Patricia: Kant's Thinker. Oxford 2011: 19f.; 
McLear, Colin: Kant on Animal Consciousness. In: Philosopher's Imprint 11/15 (2011): 5. 
2 Ameriks, Karl and Steve Naragon: Translators’ Introduction. In: Lectures on Metaphysics. Cambridge 
1997: xvi–xviii. 
3 Adickes gives the following possible dating: 1769? 1769–70? 1764–66? The Reflexion appears at §140 
of Meier’s text, where Meier discusses what he means by comprehension [begreifen]. 
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Erkenntniß überhaupt lassen sich folgende 
Grade denken, nach welchen dieselbe in dieser 
Rücksicht kann gesteigert werden: 
Der erste Grad der Erkenntniß ist: sich etwas 
vorstellen; 
Der zweite: sich mit Bewußtsein etwas 
vorstellen oder wahrnehmen (percipere); 
Der dritte: etwas kennen (noscere) oder sich 
etwas in der Vergleichung mit andern Dingen 
vorstellen sowohl der Einerleiheit als der 
Verschiedenheit nach; 
Der vierte: mit Bewußtsein etwas kennen, d.h. 
erkennen (cognoscere). Die Thiere kennen auch 
Gegenstände, aber sie erkennen sie nicht. 
Der fünfte: etwas verstehen (intelligere), d.h. 
durch den Verstand vermöge der Begriffe 
erkennen oder concipiren. Dieses ist vom 
Begreifen sehr unterschieden. Concipiren kann 
man Vieles, obgleich man es nicht begreifen 
kann, z.B. ein perpetuum mobile, dessen 
Unmöglichkeit in der Mechanik gezeigt wird. 
Der sechste: etwas durch die Vernunft erkennen 
oder einsehen (perspicere). Bis dahin gelangen 
wir in wenigen Dingen und unsre Erkenntnisse 
werden der Zahl nach immer geringer, je mehr 
wir sie dem Gehalte nach vervollkommnen 
wollen. 
[...] 
1. sich etwas vorstellen. 
2. etwas wissen. mit Bewustseyn vorstellen. (s 
sich mit Bewustseyn vorstellen.) (s warnehmen 
percipere.) (s apprehendere fassen: der Anfang 
des percipere.) 
3. etwas kennen. Dadurch in der Vergleichung 
von andern unterscheiden. 
4. etwas verstehen (s was ich kenne und 
verstehe, das erkenne ich.) (s anderen vortragen 
und mittheilen können.) etwas durch den 
Verstand erkennen. (s concipere: durch einen 
Begrif erkennen. intelligere: durch ein Urtheil.) 
(s wissen -- meynen.) 
5. etwas einsehen. (s perspicere.) etwas durch 
die Vernunft erkenen. (s a priori etwas 
verstehen.) (s durch Gründe: entweder mögliche 







There are several striking differences between the two texts, and these suggest that Jäsche 
took a bit too much liberty in compiling the Logik. Nevertheless, a careful consideration 
of the differences between the two texts, along with several other texts, will help us better 
understand Kant’s views as well as support many of Jäsche’s own modifications. 
2. Erkenntnis as Genus and Degree of Itself 
Jäsche’s most puzzling modification is to make Erkenntnis a degree of itself. In 
this section, I explain how this can be made sense of and show how it is related to 
Jäsche’s additional modification of treating the degrees as graded in terms of “objectiver 
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Gehalt”. 
Kant’s Reflexion does not state what these degrees are of, and it only includes six 
degrees, none of which are labeled as Erkenntnis. So it is quite a significant departure for 
Jäsche both to describe the degrees as being ones of Erkenntnis and to insert Erkenntnis 
as a fourth degree of itself. Given this, it appears that Jäsche is responsible for the 
confusing view that Erkenntnis is itself a degree of Erkenntnis. And if we limit ourselves 
to the above Reflexion penned by Kant, we are given no evidence to think of Erkenntnis 
either as a degree suitable for this sort of list or as the overall genus of the degrees. 
Jäsche’s additions raise two important questions. First, what did Kant himself take 
these degrees to be degree of, i.e., what is the genus of which the degrees are species? 
Second, how does cognition relate to these degrees? In this section, I limit my focus to 
the first of these questions, and I turn to the second in the next section. 
Let us consider first the textual evidence concerning what Kant might have taken 
to be the genus of the degrees. As far as I have been able to determine, there are only 
three other writings penned by Kant himself that give similar lists of degrees.4 
Unfortunately, none of these attribute the degrees with a genus, and these lists also differ 
from each other in what are counted as degrees. In students’ notes of Kant’s lectures on 
logic, we find similar but nevertheless varying lists of degrees. There are at least six 
different descriptions of what the degrees are of: 1) Erkenntnis,5 2) “human 
Erkenntnis”,6 3) “our Erkenntnis”,7 4) “concepts”,8 5) “distinctness”,9 and 6) different 
manners of representing things.10 Thus, explicit textual evidence concerning the genus of 
the degrees is inconclusive. 
Nevertheless, Kant’s well-known “Stufenleiter” gives us a hint for explaining 
Jäsche’s choice to characterize the degrees as being of Erkenntnis.11 According to the 
Stufenleiter, what is distinctive about Erkenntnis is that it relates to an object 
                                                 
4 Refl, AA 16: 81f.; 536f.; 538f. 
5 V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 132. 
6 V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 134. 
7 V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 136. 
8 V-Lo/Philippi, AA 24: 418. 
9 V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 845. 
10 V-Lo/Busolt, AA 24: 636. 
11 KrV A319f./B376f. 
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[Gegenstand]. R2394 fits this characterization of cognition insofar as each of the degrees 
it gives pertain to representing something [etwas]. In addition to the Stufenleiter, Jäsche 
had access to many other passages that suggest that what is distinctive about Erkenntnis 
is its having a relation to an object.12 If Jäsche consulted these texts, he quite reasonably 
would have taken Erkenntnis in general to be a mental state or act that relates to an 
object. And since Kant’s handwritten note portrays different degrees or manners in which 
objects are represented, we can see why Jäsche might have taken their genus to be 
Erkenntnis.13 
Furthermore, Kant’s logic textbook itself, Meier’s Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, 
seems a likely additional ground for Jäsche treating Kant’s degrees as being of 
Erkenntnis. Near the beginning of his work, Meier treats “Vorstellung” as identical with 
the Latin terms “repraesentatio” and “perceptio”.14 Following this, he characterizes 
Erkenntnis in the following manner: 
Die Erkenntniss (cognitio) ist entweder ein Inbegriff vieler Vorstellungen, oder diejenige Handlung, 
wodurch eine Vorstellung einer Sache gewürkt wird. Man kann auch, ohne einen merklichen Irrthum 
zu besorgen, Vorstellungen und Erkenntniss für einerlei halten.15 
This passage imparts three lessons. First, it helps explain not only why Jäsche might have 
used the notions of representation and Erkenntnis interchangeably but also why Kant 
often does so. Second, Kant’s handwritten note occurs around §140 of his copy of 
Meier’s Auszug, in the middle of a discussion of varying types of clearness and 
distinctness of Erkenntnis. This is significant because Meier classifies and grades 
Erkenntnis in these passages according to the manner of sophistication in which it 
represents an object. Hence, if Jäsche were to have consulted Meier’s work, he would 
have been given reason to take Kant’s own degrees as being of Erkenntnis. Third, 
Christian Wolff’s Deutsche Metaphysik—a significant influence on Meier—treats 
Erkenntnis as a mental state or act that relates to an object.16 
                                                 
12 KrV Bixf., Bxviif.; Refl, AA 16: 83.08-10, 85.10-14, 246.01f., 538.17f. 
13 I also suspect, for this and other reasons, that Jäsche had access to the Blomberg notes on Kant’s logic 
lectures, which provide the only other lists of degrees that treats the genus as being cognition. See V-
Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 132, 134, 136. 
14 Meier, Georg Friedrich: Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre. Halle 1752: §10. 
15 Meier, Georg Friedrich: Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre. Halle 1752: §11. 
16 Wolff, Christian: Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen 
Dingen überhaupt. Ed. by J. Ecole, H. W. Arndt, R. Theis, W. Schneiders and S. Carboncini-Gavanelli. 
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Jäsche’s recognition of the intimate tie between Erkenntnis and objects is likely 
the source of his grading the degrees according to “objectiver Gehalt”. Although this is a 
phrase which as far as I can tell Kant himself never uses, Jäsche’s use of it seems to be on 
the right track. For unlike the Stufenleiter, Kant’s logical grading in R2394 is not meant 
to be a categorization or ranking of our mental states in general; rather, it ranks only 
those mental states that relate to an object. Accordingly, whereas the Stufenleiter starts 
with representation in general, the Logik passage starts with representation of something. 
Although the Stufenleiter passage suggests that representations do not necessarily have 
an object—as that only comes in at the level of Erkenntnis in the Stufenleiter—his use of 
“Vorstellung” sometimes does treat representations as having objects merely in virtue of 
being representations.17 But again, given Meier’s treatment of representation and 
Erkenntnis as equivalent, and given Kant’s familiarity with Meier, this is not so 
surprising. This does not mean that Kant assumes that all representations have objective 
content; rather, it means that Kant often considers only those representations that have 
objective content. Even if the notion of “objectiver Gehalt” comes ultimately from 
Jäsche, it nevertheless seems to be an apt way of expressing how each higher degree in 
Kant’s list at R2394 presents an object in a more sophisticated manner than the last. 
We can now address what exactly Kant’s degrees are of and how they are graded. 
The overall list is one of mental states or acts that relate to objects, and these come in 
degrees insofar as a mental state or act can portray an object in more or less sophisticated 
manners. This seems clear enough, whether or not we want to follow Jäsche in 
characterizing all the degrees either as Erkenntnis or as having objektiver Gehalt. 
3. Kenntnis, Verstehen, and Erkenntnis 
Although we have seen reasons why Jäsche was warranted in treating the degrees 
as being of Erkenntnis, it is still peculiar why he would add Erkenntnis itself as a fourth 
degree, thereby making the characterization of Erkenntnis circular. Out of all of Kant’s 
own various lists of degrees and students’ lecture notes, only two list Erkenntnis or the 
Latin “cognition” as a distinct degree of its own.18 But in R2394 quoted above, Kant 
                                                 
Hildesheim 2003: §278. 
17 This is most prominently suggested at KrV A104. 
18 Refl, AA 16: 81.19-21, 538.17f. It is also notable that neither of these lists mention acquaintance [etwas 
kennen], leaving only R2394 as the primary source for Kant’s own thoughts concerning that notion. 
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introduces the notion of Erkenntnis in his presentation of the fourth degree: “etwas 
verstehen”. This degree is represented in most of the various lists of degrees to be found 
in Kant’s Reflexionen and in students’ lecture notes. 
The relation between cognition and understanding is tricky to discern in R2394. 
In what Adickes took to be the original Reflexion, Kant describes verstehen as “etwas 
durch den Verstand erkennen”. This would seem to support not only that Jäsche 
distinguished the two from one another but also that he treated understanding as a species 
of cognition. Nevertheless, Adickes’s dating suggests that the original Reflexion was 
from Kant’s pre-critical thought. I suggest that if we want to use the passage for 
understanding Kant’s critical thought, we should place greater weight on what Adickes 
took to be a later addition to the Reflexion, namely the claim that “was ich kenne und 
verstehe, das erkenne ich”. 
This last claim is more noteworthy for interpreting Kant’s critical thought because 
it gestures at the important doctrine that Erkenntnis requires both intuition and 
concepts.19 For there is good reason to take kennen to occur through intuition and 
verstehen to occur through concepts. To be acquainted with something [etwas kennen] is 
to represent an empirical object as identical to or different from other things, and intuition 
makes this possible insofar as identical or different characteristic marks of empirical 
objects are represented by means of intuition. To understand something [etwas verstehen] 
further allows for that thing to be distinctly represented, such that a characteristic mark of 
a thing is “cognized as a characteristic mark of the thing”.20 Hence to understand 
something is not only to represent that thing as identical to or different from other things 
but also to be capable of becoming aware of one’s reasons for such discriminations 
between things. Understanding in this sense occurs by means of concepts because an 
awareness of such reasons requires that one make judgments,21 which for Kant always 
use concepts.22 
I suggest, then, that if we are to place Erkenntnis as a degree of its own on Kant’s 
list, it should come after understanding rather than before, as in Jäsche’s text. 
                                                 
19 KrV A51f./B75f. 
20 DfS, AA 2: 58.26. 
21 DfS, AA2: 58.27. 
22 KrV A68f./B93f. 
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4. Non-Human Animal Representations 
The last notable addition of Jäsche’s that I want to address concerns the 
representations of non-human animals. Recall that the third degree in Jäsche’s list is to be 
acquainted with something [etwas kennen] and that the fourth degree is to cognize 
[erkennen] something. In the discussion of the fourth degree, Jäsche writes that cognition 
is acquaintance with consciousness, and he clarifies this by stating that animals are only 
acquainted with things but do not cognize them. Since for Kant human beings have 
cognition and not just acquaintance, it would seem that whatever produces cognition over 
and above mere acquaintance is what distinguishes us from animals. Indeed, this fits the 
claim of my previous section that Kant holds that cognition requires understanding in 
addition to acquaintance. In many places Kant maintains that understanding is required 
for cognition,23 and there is abundant evidence that he holds—following Wolff and 
Baumgarten—that animals lack understanding.24 
To this extent, Jäsche is faithful to Kant’s thought. Nevertheless, commentators 
have been misled by what the Logik states about animals’ representational capacities.25 
Jäsche’s text both asserts that animals have acquaintance and presents acquaintance as 
coming after wahrnehmen, “sich mit Bewußtsein etwas vorstellen”. Taking these features 
of Jäsche’s text together, it might seem that Kant attributes animals with consciousness. 
But this appearance is mistaken. First, there is sizable evidence that Kant denies that 
animals have consciousness.26 
Second, there is good reason to think that Kant is committed to denying animal 
consciousness. Kant uses “Bewusstsein” to refer to two different things. On the one hand, 
it can refer to empirical consciousness, which is treated as equivalent to either inner 
sense27 or empirical apperception.28 On the other hand, “Bewusstsein” can refer to pure 
consciousness, which is treated as equivalent to transcendental apperception.29 Kant 
                                                 
23 KrV Bxviif., A67f./B92f., A78f./B104; Refl, AA 16: 298.07-14, 300.08-10; V-Met/Mron, AA 29: 800. 
24 DfS, AA 02: 59f.; KU, AA 05: 464; V-Met/Dohna, AA 28: 689f.; V-Met-L1/Pölitz, AA28: 276; V-
Met/Mron, AA 29: 878f., 906f.; V-Met/Volckmann, AA 28:448-450. 
25 E.g., McLear, Colin: Kant on Animal Consciousness. In: Philosopher's Imprint 11/15 (2011). 
26 PhilEnz, AA 29: 44f.; V-Met/Dohna, AA 28: 689f.; V-Met-L2/Pölitz, AA 28: 594; V-Met/Mron, AA 29: 
845-847. 
27 KrV B153; Refl, AA 16: 80.08, AA 18: 72; V-Met-L1/Pölitz, AA 28: 265, 277. 
28 KrV A107; V-Met/Dohna, AA 28: 670-673. 
29 Anth, AA 07: 134, 140-142; V-Met/Dohna, AA 28: 670f.; V-Met/Mron, AA 29: 878. 
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clearly denies that animals have transcendental apperception. This point is not only 
asserted in several of the earlier-cited passages concerning animals but also suggested 
most prominently at the start of the Anthropologie.30 So, it is clear that Kant does not 
attribute animals with pure consciousness or transcendental apperception. That leaves us 
with the possibility that animals might have empirical consciousness. But Kant is also 
explicit that empirical consciousness or inner sense presupposes transcendental 
apperception.31 Thus, since animals lack the latter, they lack the former as well. Hence, 
Kant is committed to denying that animals have any form of consciousness. 
Conclusion 
We have seen that Kant himself does not characterize Erkenntnis circularly, but 
rather that Jäsche ended up with this result in trying to flesh out Kant’s handwritten note. 
Jäsche correctly discerned both that “Erkenntnis” for Kant designates a mental state or 
act that relates to an object and that Kant’s own handwritten degrees are graded in terms 
of the sophistication of the manner in which an object is represented. Nonetheless, 
Jäsche’s text is misleading in two ways. First, it mistakenly treats understanding as a 
species of Erkenntnis, where Kant clearly maintains that understanding is a condition for 
Erkenntnis. Second, it suggests that Kant held that animals have consciousness, even 
though it is more plausible that Kant denies that animals have consciousness. 
                                                 
30 Anth, AA 07: 127. 
31 KrV A117, B139f., B154; V-Met-L2/Pölitz, AA 28: 590f.; V-Met/Mron, AA 29: 448-450. 
